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WHY DOES THE SEC HATE LAWYERS AND
WILL THE BITTERNESS EVER GO AWAY: A
REVIEW OF THE REASONS FOR THE
CURRENT STATE OF THIS RELATIONSHIP
AND A PROPOSED PATH FORWARD
Ernest Edward Badway *, Joshua Horn ** & Christie McGuinness ***
ABSTRACT
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or
“Commission”) and its staff (“Staff”) have brought numerous actions
against lawyers in a variety of contexts over the last several years. These
enforcement actions have arguably prevented zealous advocacy as well as
potentially leaving lawyers reluctant to make certain arguments on behalf
of their clients so as to avoid potential disciplinary actions against them.
While it is important for the Commission and its Staff to ensure that lawyers
do not engage in violative conduct, this Article notes that the SEC and its
Staff’s actions should be limited to only those occasions where the conduct
is notorious and obvious. To avoid unwarranted interference in the right to
counsel, this Article argues, at the very least, that the SEC should instead of
bringing circumspect actions: (1) clarify the SEC’s approach to its use of
Rule 102(e); (2) make mandatory referrals to state bar associations; and
(3) create an independent board to review potential SEC actions against
lawyers to ensure the good faith nature of the proposed action.
INTRODUCTION
Despite recent court decisions limiting the reach of its enforcement
power and administrative courts, the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) and its staff (“Staff”) continue to
bring enforcement actions against lawyers in a variety of scenarios. A
growing area of concern is the SEC’s focus on attorney discipline, a field
that was traditionally left to the states and their attorney disciplinary
processes. The SEC’s focus on attorney discipline threatens zealous
advocacy and independent legal judgments. These actions alter the scope of
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** Mr. Horn is partner with and co-chair of the Securities Industry Group of Fox
Rothschild LLP in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and New York, New York.
*** Ms. McGuinness is an associate at Saul, Ewing, Arnstein & Lehr LLP, and is a
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the SEC’s substantive authority and intrude on matters appropriately
delegated to state bar organizations.
This Article demonstrates that, to provide the greatest benefit to the
public, lawyers and courts, rather than the SEC, should be responsible for
regulating attorney conduct. 1 This Article further suggests a series of
proposals that seek to prevent the SEC from deputizing the securities bar
with tasks that bring them into conflict with their clients. In particular, the
SEC must clarify the scope of SEC Rule of Practice 102(e) (“Rule 102(e)”
or “Rule”). Specifically, the SEC should include language that limits the
term “improper or unethical conduct” under the Rule to intentional
misconduct, precludes legal opinions rendered in good faith from its
purview, and establishes that “practicing” before the Commission only
encompasses representation in a pending investigation. Additionally, the
SEC should refer all professional conduct violations to state bar
associations rather than initiate de novo enforcement proceedings. Lastly,
there must be greater protections in place for attorneys practicing before the
SEC. This may be accomplished by creating an independent board to
review the SEC’s enforcement charges against lawyers and field complaints
from lawyers under investigation.
Any discussion of this particular area must begin with the SEC’s
disciplinary view towards lawyers. Part I traces the SEC’s attitude towards
prosecuting lawyers under the federal securities laws and Rule 102(e). Part
II continues this examination through our current landscape, discussing
Altman, an infamous Rule 102(e) proceeding, and certain reforms in the
wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”). Part III
discusses the SEC’s present enforcement priorities, and identifies particular
areas where attorneys face increasing agency scrutiny. Finally, Part IV
suggests a series of solutions to ensure the SEC remains fair and consistent
in its prosecutions of lawyers.
I. THE TRADITIONAL RULES GOVERNING A LAWYER’S
CONDUCT
Traditionally, the SEC only prosecuted lawyers for their role as primary
violators of the federal securities laws. 2 Today, however, improper
lawyering—even poor legal advice—may lead to an investigation or

1. See, e.g., In re Carter & Johnson, No. 292, Release No. 17597, 1981 WL 384414, at *25
(Feb. 28, 1981) (observing that “[s]ignificant public benefits flow from the effective performance
of the securities lawyer’s role.”).
2. Lawyers were also commonly held liable as aiders and abettors to a primary violator, for
instance, by falsifying documents during an SEC investigation. Jean Eaglesham, Legal Eagles in
Cross Hairs, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2012, 8:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304868004577376391979631740.
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enforcement proceeding. 3 The SEC sometimes disciplines securities
lawyers using three avenues. 4 Attorneys, like any other individuals, may be
charged for their role in violating the federal securities laws. Additionally,
the Commission may investigate and sanction attorneys practicing before
the agency pursuant to Rule 102(e), if it deems that the attorney has
engaged in unsuitable conduct. 5 Lastly, lawyers that commit perjury or
obstruct SEC investigations may be referred to the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”), or to state attorneys general or local prosecutors for criminal
prosecution.
Increasingly, securities lawyers are finding themselves marked for
ethical infractions. The Commission’s amplified scrutiny in this area stems
from its perception that attorneys, like underwriters or auditors, are
“gatekeepers.” 6 This Part I will trace the history of attorney discipline under
the relevant provisions of the federal securities laws and Rule 102(e).
A. THE SEC’S USE OF SECTION 10(B) AGAINST ATTORNEYS
1. Section 10(b)—Beware: No Country for Timid Attorneys
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange
Act”) 7 is the essential catchall antifraud provision, prohibiting the use of
fraudulent practices in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.8
This provision and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act precluded, among other
things, insider trading and making materially false statements to the public
“in connection with” a pending corporate event or information. Under
Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act, the SEC may also bring an action
against any individual who “knowingly provide[s] substantial assistance” to
a primary Section 10(b) violator. 9 In fact, the SEC has demonstrated a
3. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Lawyer Gets 20 Years in $700 Million Fraud, N.Y. TIMES
(July 13, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/nyregion/14dreier.html?_r=0 (noting an
example of an attorney found guilty for operating multimillion-dollar Ponzi scheme); Altman v.
SEC, 666 F.3d 1322, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding a permanent ban against attorney for
“unethical or improper professional conduct” in violation of Rule 102(e)).
4. SEC Enforcers Continue to Witness ‘Poor Practices’ by Some Defense Attorneys, 44 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 21, at 1008 (May 21, 2012).
5. Rule 102(e) has three subsections that give the SEC independent grounds to temporarily
bar or permanently ban an attorney, or other professional, from appearing or practicing before it.
These provisions are discussed in greater detail below. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102 (2006).
6. See Kara M. Stein, Comm’r, SEC, Keynote Address at Compliance Week 2014 (May 19,
2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2104-spch051914kms (transcript available on SEC
website) (“[O]ne gatekeeper that often is absent from the list of cases I see every week are the
lawyers . . . I think we should carefully review the role that lawyers play in our markets, with a
view towards how they can better help deter misconduct and prevent fraud.”).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
8. Id.
9. JOHN C. COFFEE & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
1115 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 12th ed. 2012). Significantly, the Supreme Court has foreclosed
any such aiding and abetting liability in private causes of action. Cent. Bank of Denv., N.A. v.
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willingness to rely on Section 20(e) to prosecute attorneys for their role in
facilitating a client’s primary 10(b) violation.10 The SEC may also use Rule
102(e) to suspend an attorney from practicing before the Commission for
violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 11 In other cases, the Commission
may also refer Section 10(b) violations to the DOJ for criminal
proceedings. 12
2. Lawyers Charged with Exchange Act Violations
The SEC has not been shy with using Exchange Act Sections 10(b) and
20(e) to charge lawyers. For example, SEC v. Fehn is a leading case on
Exchange Act Section 20 liability that attacks securities lawyers who advise
clients on materially false or misleading disclosures. 13 H. Thomas Fehn, a
seasoned securities lawyer, was hired by CTI Technical, Inc. (“CTI”) to
represent the company in an SEC investigation regarding its purportedly
tainted initial public offering. 14 Upon being retained, Fehn became aware
that CTI had neglected to comply with its obligation to file a Form 10-Q, a
quarterly report, pursuant to Sections 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act. 15
Fehn voiced concern over these violations with Wheeler, CTI’s promoter
and control person. 16 He advised Wheeler that the company should make
the required disclosures. 17 The lawyer’s suggestions, however, were met
with adamant refusal. 18 Ultimately, Fehn edited and signed off on a partial
disclosure document that omitted material information about CTI. 19 The
document, initially prepared by a non-attorney employee, did not accurately
portray Wheeler’s controlling role in the company, and omitted potential
civil liability CTI faced as a result of earlier state and federal securities law
violations.20
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that
Fehn was liable under Section 20 for providing substantial assistance to

First Interstate Bank of Denv., 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994); see also Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 153 (2011).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Kluger, 722 F.3d 549 (3d Cir. 2013); SEC v. Payton, No. 14CV-4644, 2015 WL 1539454 (Apr. 6, 2015).
11. See, e.g., Attorney Suspended for Insider Trading, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 2434, at 8
(June 30, 2010) (noting that under Rule 102(e), a corporate attorney may be suspended from
appearing or practicing before the Commission for at least five years after being found liable for
insider trading); In re Melissa A. Mahler, Exchange Act Release No. 34-62267 (June 10, 2010).
12. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (upholding insider trading
charges against former counsel).
13. SEC v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996).
14. Id. at 1280–81.
15. Id. at 1281.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1281.
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CTI, a primary violator of Section 10(b). 21 Substantial assistance included
the “‘participation’ in the editing of information for the purposes of
marketing securities.” 22 Fehn undoubtedly made personal edits to the
documents in question and failed to adequately advise CTI on the effect of
the material omissions therein.
However, Fehn argued that legal advice rendered in good faith,
although improper, precluded a finding of “substantial assistance.” 23 The
Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that, regardless of Fehn’s subjective good
faith, his actions and efforts were neither reasonable in light of existing
disclosure obligations nor consistent with the policy of open disclosure,
pointing out, “[s]ecurities regulation in this country is premised,” 24 upon
such disclosures. The Ninth Circuit stressed that it is “incumbent upon
practitioners . . . to be highly familiar with the disclosure requirements and
to insist that their clients comply with them.” 25
3. Lessons Learned for Lawyers
The Fehn case reminds attorneys to be vigilant and to ensure that they
are not engaging in conduct that rises to “substantial assistance” in their
clients’ wrongdoing. 26 Lawyers should be cognizant that disagreement with
management over disclosure of corporate information is common. In these
situations, risk aversion is a facet of good lawyering rather than a sign of
weakness.
Thus, lawyers may lessen both their own and their clients’ exposure to
Section 10(b) liability by urging companies to be overly inclusive in their
disclosures. Lawyers must not be timid in conversations with management
who may push back against such advice. It may also be helpful to offer
quantitative financial information to support a recommendation that certain
narrative disclosures must be made. As such, it may persuade a resistant
executive that a given event, uncertainty, trend, or demand would be
material if it were to occur, and, therefore, ought to be disclosed.
B. THE SEC’S DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS UNDER SECTION 17(A)
1. Section 17(a) Liability for Bad Advice After Weiss?
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) forbids
fraud in connection with the “offer or sale” of a security. 27 The SEC is not
21. Id. at 1293–94.
22. Id. at 1293 (quoting Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910, 918 (6th Cir.

1991).
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 1294. Mr. Fehn was relying on In re Carter & Johnson.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1293.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012).
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required to prove or plead scienter when it brings an action under Sections
17(a)(2) and (a)(3); it may succeed by proving the attorney acted
negligently. 28 To avoid liability, lawyers must be extremely judicious when
rendering legal advice to ensure their opinions do not deviate from a
“standard of reasonable prudence.” 29
2. The Application of Section 17(a) Against Lawyers
Congruently, the SEC has not been shy about using this provision
against lawyers. In 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia upheld an SEC finding that Ira Weiss, bond counsel to a
Pennsylvania school district, issued legal opinions in violation of Sections
17(a)(2) and (a)(3). 30 Weiss’ opinions concerned the tax-exempt status of a
set of municipal bonds issued by the Neshannock Township School District
(“School District”). 31 Weiss, who served as bond counsel in over 100
transactions, 32 advised the School District that interest on bonds issued to
fund a construction project would be tax-free. 33
Nonetheless, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has a three-part test
to determine if a local government bond issuance is tax-free. 34 A local
government entity may issue up to $10 million in tax-exempt notes and
legally invest the proceeds in higher-yielding securities for a three-year
period, so long as the issuer satisfies the “expenditure, time, and due
diligence tests.” 35 Under the first prong, 85% of net proceeds from the
issuance must be allocated to expenditures on the relevant capital project
within a three-year period. Under the “time” prong, the issuer must incur,
within six months of issuance, a binding obligation to a third party to
expend no less than 5% of the proceeds on said projects. Finally, the issuer
must pursue completion of the capital projects and allocation of net
proceeds with due diligence. Importantly, an issuer satisfies the
“expenditure, time, and due diligence” rubric upon its reasonable
expectations at the time the notes are issued. 36
According to Weiss, it was reasonable to believe that the issuance
presented no red flags. His opinion complied with the National Association
of Bond Lawyer’s Model Bond Opinion Report, and he was also assured
that the School District intended to proceed with the construction projects,

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

COFFEE & SALE, supra note 9, at 917.
In re Weiss, Exchange Act Release No. 52875, 2005 WL 3273381, at *14 (Dec. 2, 2005).
Weiss v. SEC, 468 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 855.
Weiss & Shupe II, Securities Act Release No. 275, 2005 WL 454017, at *5 (ALJ Feb. 25,
2005) (Initial Decision).
33. Id. at *2, *7.
34. Weiss, Securities Act Release No. 52875, 2005 WL 3273381, at *3 (Dec. 2, 2005).
35. Id.
36. Id. at *13.
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making the requisite and timely expenditures. 37 As it turned out, however,
the IRS determined that the interest on the notes was taxable. The SEC
subsequently charged that Weiss negligently offered an unqualified opinion
as to the tax-exempt status of these instruments thereby violating Sections
17(a)(2) and (a)(3). 38
After an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), pre-Lucia v. SEC, 39 found in
favor of Weiss, the Commission reversed the decision by a four-to-one
margin. Noting the lesser state of mind requirement under Sections 17(a)(2)
and (a)(3), the Commission wrote that Weiss “knew or should have known
that the note transaction was intended to earn arbitrage profits, and that the
School District lacked sufficiently concrete plans for the use of the proceeds
to justify . . . tax-exempt status.” 40 The D.C. Circuit upheld the SEC’s
determination. 41

37. Weiss & Shupe II, Securities Act Release No. 275, 2005 WL 454017, at *14 (ALJ Feb. 25,
2005) (Initial Decision).
38. Weiss, Securities Act Release No. 52875, 2005 WL 3273381, at *1 (Dec. 2, 2005).
39. The SEC’s entire administrative court process has been thrown into chaos by the recent
Supreme Court decision in Lucia v. SEC. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018).
Essentially, the United States Supreme Court in Lucia sent shock waves through the securities
industry and the SEC’s enforcement program when it held that SEC ALJs are “inferior officers,”
and must be chosen pursuant to the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at
2058. That is, the President, with the advice and consent of the United States Senate, may appoint
“all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments.” See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Initially, the case involved a former
investment adviser who was sanctioned by an SEC ALJ. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that SEC ALJs were not subject to the Appointments Clause;
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit had found differently. See Lucia
v. SEC, 736 F. App’x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2018). In her opinion, Justice Elena Kagan found that the
SEC’s ALJs were very similar to tax court trial judges where the Supreme Court had previously
found those judges to be inferior officers subject to the Appointments Clause. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at
2047–48.
Now that the Supreme Court has opened this door with the finding that SEC ALJs are inferior
officers, the SEC’s ALJ’s will have to be appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause in the
future, and it calls into question what, if anything, will happen to the ALJs at other federal
agencies. Further, there will be the question regarding prior SEC cases. The Supreme Court stated
that not every Appointments Clause violation requires a new hearing. However, time will tell.
Additionally, although Justice Kagan specifically said it was not being addressed in this case,
we may also shortly see that, since the SEC’s ALJs are now considered inferior officers subject to
the Appointments Clause, they may also now be subject to removal by the SEC Chairman for
good cause. Such a result may provide significant power to the president to fire such ALJs at will,
maybe even in a Tweet. Of course, Mr. Lucia will have a re-trial before either the full SEC or a
new ALJ appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause, who will determine if his “Buckets of
Money” program is real or made-up.
In short, the Supreme Court has upended how the SEC does business.
40. Weiss, Securities Act Release No. 52875, 2005 WL 3273381, at *13 (Dec. 2, 2005).
41. Weiss v. SEC, 468 F.3d 849, 855–56 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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3. Another Lesson for Lawyers
The result in Weiss should scare securities lawyers given the SEC’s use
of Section 17(a), an antifraud provision, to reprimand a lawyer for
providing what turned out to be poor advice. Prior to the decision, attorneys
relied on Carter & Johnson, a 1981 Rule 102(e) proceeding discussed
below, to assuage concerns that lawyers would be disciplined by the agency
for giving bad advice, even if that advice is negligent and perhaps worse. 42
After Weiss, however, the Commission appears willing to bring
enforcement actions for legal opinions, as long as the attorney’s “conduct
depart[s] from the standard of reasonable prudence and [is] at least
negligent.” 43 This new form of discipline is discussed directly below.
C. ATTORNEYS DISCIPLINED FOR FRAUDULENT SECURITIES ACT
SECTION 5 DEALS
Section 5 of the Securities Act governs the registration process of
securities. 44 Attorneys are integrally involved in the preparation of a
company’s registration materials. Equally important, lawyers are tasked
with advising an issuer about whether it may qualify for an exemption from
registration. Attorneys will be prosecuted in SEC enforcement actions for
their role in furthering a client’s non-compliance or fraud in connection
with its Section 5 responsibilities as indicated below. One particular area of
trouble for attorneys is when an attorney renders opinion letters indicating
that resale restrictions may be removed in an unregistered Securities Act
Rule 144A offering. The SEC has brought actions against attorneys holding
them liable as “indirect seller[s]” in violation of Section 5.45 In SEC v.
Greenstone Holdings, 46 the court held that a lawyer violated Section 5 as an
“indirect seller” when she drafted a false opinion letter in connection with a
faulty Rule 144 offering. 47

42. In re Carter & Johnson, No. 292, 47 S.E.C. 471, 1981 WL 384414, at *25 (Feb. 28, 1981).
43. In re Weiss, Exchange Act Release No. 52875, 2005 WL 3273381, at *14 (Dec. 2, 2005);

see also SEC v. RPM Int’l Inc., 1:16-cv-01803 (Sept. 9, 2016) (noting that the SEC brought an
action against Edward W. Moore, general counsel and chief compliance officer, for violating
Sections 17(a)(2) and (a)(3) of the Securities Act and Rules 13b2-1 and 13b2-2 under the
Exchange Act. The complaint alleged that Moore failed to disclose material information—the
DOJ investigation—to RPM’s shareholders and the firm’s audit firm.).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
45. See SEC v. CMKM Diamonds, Inc., 729 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2013); see also THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, REMEDIES FOR VIOLATION OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 (AND OTHER
CONSEQUENCES OF DEFICIENT REGISTRATION STATEMENTS), 2 LAW SEC. REG. § 7.15 (2015).
46. See SEC v. Greenstone Holdings, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
47. Id. at 214–15.
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D. RULE 102(E) AND THE REGULATION OF THE PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT OF SECURITIES LAWYERS
1. Background & Rule 102(e)’s Early Years
Rule 102(e) authorizes the Commission to permanently or temporarily
bar securities professionals from practicing or appearing before the
agency. 48 The Rule contains three separate bases that may lead to either
attorney suspension or disbarment. 49 Rule 102(e)(1)(i) applies when the
SEC deems that an attorney does not possess the requisite qualifications to
represent others. 50 The Commission may rely on Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) if it
finds the attorney lacks in character or integrity, or has engaged in
“unethical or improper conduct.” 51 Rule 102(e)(1)(iii) is used to sanction
counsel who have willfully violated or aided and abetted a violation of the
federal securities laws, or rules and regulations thereunder. 52
While the Rule’s numbering has changed, 53 the essential provisions of
Rule 102(e) have been in place since 1935. 54 Beginning in the late 1970s,
the Commission used the Rule, then codified as Rule 2(e), to police the
professional conduct of lawyers that practiced before the SEC. 55 According
to the Commission, this was necessary to maintain the integrity of its
procedures and investigations. 56 However, the validity of the SEC’s
authority to regulate such conduct was not without its share of criticism. In
In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, 57 former Commissioner Roberta
Karmel found it especially “repugnant to our adversary system of legal
representation to permit a prosecutorial agency to discipline attorneys who

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2012).
17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1)(i)–(iii).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rule 102(e) was known as Rule 2(e) until 1995.
Gregory G. Ballard, Kevin A. Burke, and Neil D. Corcoran, “Law and Practice Under
Rule 102(e),” 48 REV. OF SEC. & COMM. REG. 14, 175 (August 19, 2015).
55. Julie Andersen Hill, Divide and Conquer: SEC Discipline of Litigation Attorneys, 22 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 373, 383 (2009) (noting that, “[p]rior to 1976, the SEC rarely used Rule 102(e)
to sanction attorneys.”) [hereinafter Hill, Divide and Conquer]; see also COFFEE & SALE, supra
note 9, at 1420 (observing that attorneys were targets under Rule 2(e) “as long as the conduct of
the [attorneys] allegedly facilitated in some fashion a violation of the federal securities laws.”).
56. See Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 579 (2d Cir. 1979) (“The Commission,
through its Rule 2(e) proceeding, is merely attempting to preserve the integrity of its own
procedures, by assuring the fitness of those professionals who represent others before the
Commission.”).
57. In re Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Securities Act Release No. 15982, 1979 WL 186370,
at *2 (July 2, 1979). In this matter, the SEC sanctioned a Cincinnati law firm under Rule 2(e),
alleging that the partners of the firm neglected their professional responsibilities when they
knowingly prepared disclosure documents with materially misleading statements. Id.
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act as counsel to regulated persons.” 58 It would appear that Commissioner
Karmel’s concerns were addressed two years later in In re Carter &
Johnson.
2. Carter & Johnson and the False Sense of Comfort that
Ensued
In a seminal holding, the SEC appeared to set limits on its prosecutorial
scope of action. In re Carter & Johnson 59 is an SEC case concerning the
scope of Rule 102(e)’s predecessor Rule 2(e). Until recently, the case was
also thought to stand for the proposition that the SEC would not sanction
attorneys for providing poor, or even negligent, legal advice.60 As the
Commission wrote, “[i]f a securities lawyer is to bring his best independent
judgment to bear on a disclosure problem, he must have the freedom [to]
make innocent—or even, in certain cases, careless—mistakes without fear
of legal liability or loss of the ability to practice before the Commission.”61
The facts of this case were quite straightforward. William R. Carter and
Charles J. Johnson, Jr., represented National Telephone Company
(“National”) and were responsible for preparing its disclosure documents. 62
When a number of the company’s public disclosures were determined to be
materially false and misleading, the Commission brought a series of actions
against National and its lawyers. 63 Pursuant to Rule 2(e), the SEC attempted
to suspend Carter and Johnson from practicing before it. 64
The SEC first alleged that the lawyers’ failure to advise National’s
board of directors of its controlling shareholder’s refusal to “disclose
adequately the company’s perilous financial condition was itself a violation
of ethical and professional standards” under then-Rule 2(e)(1)(ii). 65 The
Staff also contended that, under Rule 2(e)(1)(iii), the attorneys willfully
aided and abetted their client’s violations of the federal securities laws. 66
An ALJ initially determined that the lawyers’ conduct amounted to
violations of both Rules 2(e)(1)(ii) and 2(e)(1)(iii). 67 On appeal, however,

58. Id. at *12. Commissioner Karmel went on to assert that the “frequently made distinction
between the lawyer as an adversary versus the lawyer as an advisor cannot and should not be
made by an agency with significant prosecutorial responsibilities.” Id.
59. In re Carter & Johnson, No. 292, 47 S.E.C. 471, 1981 WL 384414, at *4–6 (Feb. 28,
1981).
60. See, e.g., SEC Enforcement Developments: Renewed Focus on Lawyers, 45 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 42, at *3–4 (2013).
61. In re Carter, 1981 WL 384414, at *25.
62. Id. at *8.
63. Id. at *9, *17.
64. Id. at *1.
65. Id. at *27.
66. Id. at *1.
67. Carter was suspended for one year, and Johnson for nine months. Id. at *1.
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the Commission dismissed the charges. 68 In overturning Carter’s and
Johnson’s Rule 2(e) suspensions, the SEC attempted to issue a clarifying
interpretation of “unethical and improper conduct,” under then-Rule
2(e)(1)(ii). 69 According to the SEC, once a lawyer is aware of a client’s
“substantial and continuing failure” to comply with disclosure obligations,
the attorney’s “continued participation violates professional standards
unless he takes prompt steps to end the client’s noncompliance.” 70
Importantly, “counseling accurate disclosure is sufficient” to prevent a
finding of improper conduct, even if the advice is not followed, so long as
the client is not “involved in a continuing course of violating the securities
laws.” 71 Essentially, the SEC shifted the risk to the clients.
3. Takeaway for Attorneys
Practitioners have, until recently, understood the Carter & Johnson
decision to support the notion that the SEC would not scrutinize lawyers’
conduct simply for rendering incorrect legal advice. 72 This appeared to be
the accepted and undisturbed policy through much of the next two decades,
and provided a level of comfort to securities practitioners.
In 2008, the Commission dismissed a cease-and-desist action against an
attorney after noting it “eschewed a [102(e)] standard that would expose an
attorney to professional discipline, ‘merely because his advice, followed by
the client, is ultimately determined to be wrong.’” 73 Earlier, in 2002, the
SEC stated it “generally should not institute Rule 102(e) proceedings
against attorneys absent a judicial determination that a lawyer has violated
the federal securities laws.” 74 Prior to that, in a 1988 release, the SEC
wrote:
Indeed, the Commission has generally utilized Rule 2(e) proceedings
against attorneys only where the attorney’s conduct has already provided
the basis for a judicial or administrative order finding a securities law
68. The Commission observed that the lawyers, who voiced concern over the adequacy of the
company’s disclosures, “were in the uncomfortable position of attempting to provide disclosure
advice to an aggressive client whose unreceptive management actively frustrated the giving of
advice and ignored what advice managed to get through.” Id. at *17. This semblance of good faith
precluded a finding that the attorney-respondents willfully aided and abetted their client’s
violations under 2(e)(1)(iii). Id. at *24–25.
69. Id. at *28.
70. Id. at *30.
71. Id. The SEC noted that the “exercise of independent, careful and informed legal judgment
on difficult issues” was “critical to the flow of material information to the securities markets.” Id.
at *25.
72. See, e.g., SEC Enforcement Developments: Renewed Focus on Lawyers, supra note 60, at
*3–4 (2013).
73. In re Monson, Exchange Act Release No. 28323, 2008 WL 2574441, at *4 (June 30, 2008)
(quoting In re Carter & Johnson, 47 SEC 471, 1981 WL 384414, at *25 (Feb. 28, 1981)).
74. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670, 71,672
(proposed Dec. 2, 2002).
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violation in a non-Rule 2(e) proceeding. Accordingly, Rule 2(e)
proceedings rarely entail the adjudication of questions concerning the
professional standards that govern the conduct of attorneys. 75
In 1982, Edward F. Greene, then the Commission’s General Counsel,
clarified that the SEC “would generally not recommend Commission
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys appearing as advocates.” 76 He
recognized that it “could have a serious chilling effect on zealous
representation and be a harbinger of prosecutorial abuse.” 77 However, most
recently, Altman v. SEC 78 demonstrates that the SEC possesses the authority
to bring original Rule 102(e) actions based entirely on professional
responsibility violations. 79
E. SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 307 AND SEC STANDARDS OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 205.3
1. Up the Ladder, Out of the Building, and Above the Bar
In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act became law, and as described above,
Congress codified Rule 102(e) as Section 4C of the Exchange Act. 80 It also
introduced Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley, authorizing the SEC to create
Rule of Conduct Part 205, thereby imposing a number of “whistleblowing”
responsibilities on corporate counsel. 81 Supporters of Sarbanes-Oxley
contended that reforms to corporate governance in the wake of Enron and
other scandals had to address the role of individual actors. 82 Congress
meant it would now hold attorneys, as well as auditors, accountants, and
other gatekeepers liable for their roles in facilitating corporate
maleficence. 83
Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley mandated that the SEC issue rules
setting forth “minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys

75. Disciplinary Proceedings Involving Professionals Appearing or Practicing Before the
Commission, Securities Act Release No. 33,6783, 1988 WL 1000021, at *10 (July 7, 1988).
76. Edward F. Greene, General Counsel, SEC, Remarks to the New York County Lawyers’
Association (Jan. 13, 1982), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1982/011382greene.pdf.
77. Id.
78. Altman v. SEC, 666 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
79. Id.
80. Congress codified Rule 102(e) in the Exchange Act by way of Section 602 of SarbanesOxley. 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3(a)(2) (2012); see also Altman, 666 F.3d at 1326–27; Marc I. Steinberg,
The Corporate/Securities Attorney as a “Moving Target”—Client Fraud Dilemmas, 46
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 9 (2006).
81. 17 C.F.R. Part 205 (2003), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm.
82. The beginning of the twenty-first century saw a few notable corporate scandals. In addition
to Enron, there were also the WorldCom and Tyco scams, both revealed in 2002. “Corporate
scandals are always a bullish signal for regulatory activity.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, The
Tournament at the Intersection of Business and Legal Ethics, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 909, 911
(2004).
83. 17 C.F.R. Part 205 (2003), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm.
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appearing and practicing before the Commission.” 84 These rules required
that, whenever evidence of a “material violation of securities law or breach
of fiduciary duty or similar violation” is apparent, the attorney must engage
in “up the ladder” reporting to the Chief Legal Officer (“CLO”) or Chief
Executive Officer (“CEO”) of the company. 85 In the event that the CEO or
CLO does not respond appropriately or implement adequate remedial
measures, the attorney must inform the audit committee, another
independent committee, or go directly to the board of directors. 86
The SEC also issued 17 C.F.R. Part 205 in response to Congress’
mandate in Section 307. 87 Part 205 contains a number of limiting features.
It applies solely to attorneys representing issuers with publicly listed
securities. 88 While the term “issuer” includes any person or entity controlled
by the issuer, 89 Part 205 does not apply to counsel for private companies,
nor does it attach to lawyers who represent underwriters. 90 Lawyers
representing individual employees or non-issuer companies are likewise not
covered by these rules. 91 However, for applicable issuers, Part 205 applies
to attorneys “appearing or practicing” before the Commission. 92 This
encompasses a broad group of lawyers, and the SEC defines the term
“appearing or practicing” to include rendering of advice, or interpreting the
securities laws, rules or regulations, as to “any document . . . that will be
filed with or submitted to the Commission, including the provision of such
advice in the context of preparing, or participating in the preparation of, any
such document.” 93
2. Part 205 and Potential Conflicts with State Bar Rules
In addition to “up the ladder” attorney reporting, when Rule of Conduct
Part 205.3(d)(2) was issued for comment, it contained a proposed
incendiary provision, permitting the disclosure of client confidences “out”
to authorities under certain circumstances. 94 This portion of the Rule was
never adopted. If it had been, it would have required an attorney to reveal
client information to the extent reasonably necessary to prevent a material
violation of the securities laws likely to cause substantial financial harm, or

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

15 U.S.C. § 7245.
Id.
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 205.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hill, Divide and Conquer, supra note 55, at 379.
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(1)(iii) (2014).
At the time of this Article’s publication, the “reporting out” provision has not been passed.
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to prevent the issuer from perpetuating a fraud upon the SEC during an
investigation or administrative proceeding. 95
This “reporting out” provision conflicted with the ethical rules imposed
by some state bar associations.96 Rule 1.6(b) of the New York Rules of
Professional Conduct (“RPC”) generally forecloses an attorney’s ability to
disclose confidential information absent exceptions.97 Under RPC 1.6(b)(2),
for instance, an attorney may disclose confidential information to the extent
reasonably necessary to prevent a client from “committing a crime.” 98
While the Part 205.3(d)(2) permits “reporting out” to prevent a “material
violation likely to cause substantial harm,” not every “material violation” of
the securities laws will amount to a crime, and thus, under New York’s
RPC 1.6(b)(2), would not result in the disclosure of client information. 99
In 2003, the Washington State Bar noted an identical conflict between
the SEC’s “reporting out” provision and its own Rule 1.6(b). 100 This
prompted an opinion letter from the State recommending that lawyers abide
by its own rule in the event of uncertainty. 101 In response, the SEC asserted
that, when “federal agencies [] implement rules of conduct that diverge
from” state laws, the federal rules take precedence. 102 Uncertainty will
remain until the precise question of whether SEC rules preempt state ethics
laws in the event of inconsistencies is judicially resolved. Nonetheless,
other states, such as New Jersey, require the type of reporting that would
have been required nationally of all lawyers if the proposed rule had been
approved. 103
In short, lawyers are advised to follow state ethics rules to avoid
conflicts on this point.

95. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2014).
96. David B. Anders, Ethical Considerations for Defense Lawyers in SEC Proceedings, 48

REV. OF SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 81 (2015). The “reporting out” provision comports with a
number of state bar associations, notably with the New Jersey State Bar Association.
97. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0-1.6 (2018).
98. See id.
99. N.Y. Cnty. Law. Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 746 (Oct. 7, 2013),
https://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications1647_0.pdf.
100. Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, General Counsel, SEC, to J. Richard Manning,
President, Washington State Bar Ass’n, and David W. Savage, President-Elect, Washington State
Bar Ass’n (July 23, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch072303gpp.htm.
101. See Washington Ethics Opinion Portends Clash Between SEC State Rules on Revealing
Fraud, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1334, 1334 (Aug. 11, 2003). Like New York,
Washington’s Rule 1.6(b)(2) also permits an attorney to disclose client confidence to the extent
reasonably necessary “to prevent the client from committing a crime.” WASH. RULE OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2) (2006).
102. Letter from Giovanni P. Prezioso, General Counsel, SEC, to J. Richard Manning,
President, Washington State Bar Ass’n, and David W. Savage, President-Elect, Washington State
Bar Ass’n (July 23, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch072303gpp.htm.

103. N.J. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (2006).
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II. THE SEC’S ATTACK ON LAWYERS: ALTMAN AND THE
SEC’S EXPANDED AUTHORITY TO PROHIBIT CERTAIN
ATTORNEY CONDUCT
The SEC demonstrated that it expanded its reach in attorney
prosecutions, most effectively, in Altman v. SEC. In Altman, the D.C.
Circuit upheld the permanent ban of an attorney under Rule 102(e)(1)(ii)
and Section 4C of the Exchange Act based solely on professional
misconduct. 104 Altman, a general commercial litigator licensed in New
York, represented Rosen, a key witness in an SEC administrative
proceeding (“AP”) against Harrison Securities (“Harrison”). 105 According
to the Commission, Rosen could offer potentially damaging evidence
against Harrison, her former employer. 106 Altman contacted Irving Einhorn,
the attorney for Harrison, and informed him that Rosen would not cooperate
with the SEC if she received a severance package. 107 In one conversation,
Altman mentioned to Einhorn that his client would fail to remember
information if she received the desired remuneration, while, on another call,
Einhorn asked: “What will we get if they [Harrison] do that, [Rosen] won’t
cooperate or [Rosen] won’t remember?” Altman responded: “Uh, probably
both.” 108 Unfortunately for Altman, Einhorn taped their phone calls.
On January 30, 2008, the SEC instituted an AP against Altman for
engaging in “unethical or improper professional conduct” in violation of
Rule 102(e)(1)(ii) and Section 4C of the Exchange Act. 109 Following an
evidentiary hearing, an ALJ found that Altman’s conduct violated
provisions of the New York State Bar Association’s Lawyer’s Code of
Professional Responsibility and Disciplinary Rules. 110 Altman was
suspended from practicing or appearing before the Commission for nine
months. 111 Shortly thereafter, both Altman and the SEC appealed.
Upon review of the decision, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s
findings, but extended Altman’s penalty to a permanent bar. 112 According
to the SEC, a lifelong ban “serves the public interest and is remedial
because it will protect the integrity of [the SEC’s] prosecutorial and

104. Altman v. SEC, 666 F.3d 1322, 1324–25 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Mike Scarcella, Tripped Up by
Recorded Calls, Litigator Appeals SEC Banishment, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 8, 2011).
105. Altman, 666 F. 3d at 1325.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. In re Altman, SEC, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-12944 (Jan. 30, 2008).
110. Altman, 666 F. 3d at 1325. Although New York City Bar opinions forbid lawyers from
taping one another, no SEC action was commenced against Einhorn for recording Altman’s calls.
See, e.g., N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 1995-2010 (1995).
111. Altman, 666 F. 3d at 1325.
112. Id.
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adjudicatory processes, and thereby the investing public, from future harm
by Altman.” 113 Altman then appealed to the D.C. Circuit.
Altman made two primary arguments in his appeal to the D.C.
Circuit: 114 (1) The SEC lacked authority to sanction him under Rule
102(e)(1)(ii) and Section 4C based on alleged violations of state bar
disciplinary rules; and (2) the Commission did not provide notice that it
would proceed against him absent prior action by New York State, and
failed to notify attorneys of the scope of conduct that violates Rule
102(e)(1)(ii) and Section 4C. 115
The court initially held that the SEC had express authority to use Rule
102(e) in response to Altman’s conduct. 116 The court looked to the plain
text of Section 4C, which “authorizes the Commission to deny the privilege
of appearance upon finding improper professional conduct.” 117 Although
the definition of “unethical or improper professional conduct” is
ambiguous, the D.C. Circuit found that violations of state bar disciplinary
rules fall within said scope. 118 The fact that the Commission effectively
stayed its hand on attorney discipline for the two decades following Carter
& Johnson was irrelevant. 119 According to the D.C. Circuit, “[t]he
Commission’s ‘powers . . . are not lost by being allowed to lie dormant.’” 120
The court then rejected Altman’s notice argument, finding that the
attorney was “on notice of his duty to comply with the New York Bar
disciplinary rules, and when appearing before the Commission, he could be
held to his duty.” 121 The court acknowledged that the SEC has never
clarified if “negligent or reckless conduct could fall within Rule 102(e)’s
ambit.” 122 Since Altman’s conduct amounted to “intentional improper

113. In re Altman, Exchange Act Release No. 63306, 2010 WL 5092725, at *20 (Nov. 10,
2010).
114. Altman, 666 F. 3d at 1324 (noting that Altman’s third argument, arguing the Commission’s
findings were not supported by substantial evidence, was summarily disposed of in the court’s
analysis of the authority and notice arguments).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1326.
118. Id. The court observed that Section 4C’s text, which tracked Rule 102(e)(1)(ii), provided
the SEC explicit authority to regulate Altman’s professional responsibility violations. It also relied
on In re Carter & Johnson, wherein the SEC stated that it perceived “no unfairness whatsoever in
holding those professionals who practice before [the Commission] to generally recognized norms
of professional conduct . . . whether or not such norms had previously been explicitly adopted or
endorsed by the Commission.” Id. (citing In re Carter & Johnson, 47 S.E.C. 471, 508 (Feb. 28,
1981)).
119. Similarly, the prior statements from the SEC Staff describing their reluctance to prosecute
de novo conduct violations were also irrelevant.
120. Altman, 666 F.3d at 1327 (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 647–48
(1950)).
121. Id. at 1328.
122. Id.
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conduct in the nature of ‘extreme departures,’” the court was satisfied that it
fell within the Rule’s scope. 123
Nonetheless, Altman leaves unresolved the question if negligent or
reckless conduct may be punished under Rule 102(e)(1)(ii). As such, the
case has marked a major source of uncertainty and frustration for securities
lawyers moving forward. For example, attorneys who are actively engaged
in having their clients avoid certain uncomfortable situations with their
employers or even the public, risk the potential of having their actions
construed as being an impediment to regulatory action. Moreover, the SEC
now has precedent to support the use of Rule 102(e) for conduct infractions
in the absence of independent securities law violations, regardless of a state
bar’s inaction to discipline the professional. Increasingly, the pressure to
prosecute individual actors, including attorneys, is echoed in the court of
public opinion. 124 Thus, the Commission’s seemingly opportunistic pursuit
of Rule 102(e) actions against attorneys with added vigor has clearly
resonated with the public. 125
The Altman conundrum, however, remains in more recent cases as well.
For example, the SEC charged and barred from practice a former corporate
counsel for allegedly participating in an unlawful sale of unregistered
securities. 126 In the Lubin matter, the SEC accused the attorney of filing
false corporate documents with the SEC resulting in over $34 million worth
of securities transactions based upon the false and misleading statements.127
Similarly, the SEC also barred from practice before the SEC an exgeneral counsel of an oil services company. 128 That case involved the exgeneral counsel assisting the co-CEOs in mailing illegal payments to a
foreign national employee that worked for the state oil company. These
payments resulted in an approximately $40 million contract for the exgeneral counsel’s company. 129
These cases illustrate the SEC’s intense attack on the lawyers, and the
breadth of conduct the SEC will consider in moving against counsel.

123. Id. (quoting Marrie v. SEC, 374 F.3d 1196, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
124. See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, General Counsel Buffeted by

Compliance Demands and Client Pressures May Face Personal Peril, 68 BUS. LAW. 57, 73
(2012).
125. See generally, Lewis D. Lowenfels, Alan R. Bromberg, and Michael J. Sullivan, Attorneys
as Gatekeepers: SEC Actions Against Lawyers in the Age of Sarbanes-Oxley, 37 U. TOL. L. REV.
877 (2006).
126. See In re Lubin, SEC. Admin Proc. File No. 3-18070 (July 19, 2017).
127. Id.
128. See In re Weisman, SEC. Admin. Proc. File No. 3-18001 (May 25, 2017).
129. Id.; Case Info.: U.S. v. Gregory Weisman, STAN. L. SCH., fcpa.stanford.edu/enforcementaction.html?id=490 (last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
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III. THE SEC’S PARTICULARIZED SCRUTINY OF ATTORNEYS
Over the last several years, the SEC and its Staff have indicated an
enhanced focus on regulating attorney conduct. For example, in January
2014, Associate General Counsel Richard Humes stated that the Division of
Enforcement would pursue more Rule 102(e) cases against attorneys for
“obstruction of commission processes.” 130 He expressly noted document
production and witness preparation as areas of concern. 131 Additionally, in a
March 2014 speech, then-SEC Chair Mary Jo White stated that a primary
emphasis of the Commission was a “renewed focus on . . . attorneys . . . and
professionals who play a critical role in the securities industry and share the
responsibility with regulators to protect investors.” 132
These comments echo the remarks of former Enforcement Director
Robert Khuzami. During a June 2011 speech to the United Jewish Appeal
Federation (“UJA”), Khuzami described four areas of attorney misconduct
the SEC finds problematic: (1) multiple representations and potential
conflicts of interest; (2) improper “coaching” of witnesses, resulting in the
witness forgetting critical information; (3) the use of internal investigations
as “advocacy pieces”; and (4) delaying tactics such as “eleventh hour”
document production. 133 Flagrant examples of attorney misconduct in any
of these areas would be legitimate concerns in any SEC investigation. For
many reading this Article, intentionally engaging in such obstreperous
conduct is something none would consider, but the equally critical aspect to
this analysis is that such conduct as defined by the SEC is often open to
widely different interpretations. Thus, all lawyers must navigate between
impermissible obstruction and zealous representation, not knowing if the
SEC will judge such conduct as violative.
A. LAWYERS’ TRIANGLE: MULTIPLE REPRESENTATIONS AND
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
As former Enforcement Director Khuzami listed “multiple
representations of witnesses,” 134 conflicts of interest may occur when
counsel represents both the company under SEC investigation as well as
130. Sidley Austin LLP, Shot Across the Bow: Loving v. IRS and SEC Rule 102(e), SEC
ENFORCEMENT
QUARTERLY:
1ST
QUARTER
2014,
10
(2014),
https://www.sidley.com/~/media/files/news/2014/05/sec-enforcement-quarterlynewsletter/files/click-here-to-view-the-newsletter/fileattachment/sec-enforcement-quarterly-1stquarter-2014.pdf.
131. Id.
132. Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Perspectives on Strengthening Enforcement,
via videoconference to the Annual Forum of the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (Mar. 24, 2014) (transcript available on SEC website).
133. Robert S. Khuzami, Dir, Div. of Enf’t, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to Criminal Law
Group of the UJA-Federation of New York (June 1, 2011) (transcript available on SEC website)
[hereinafter Khuzami, UJA Remarks].
134. Id.
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employees, who are key witnesses in the same proceeding. Although this
may raise concerns from SEC staff regarding the credibility of each
witness-employee’s testimony, at the same time, the SEC has recognized
that multiple representations may be optimal, and, in many cases, free of
any taint of impropriety. 135
Existing American Bar Association (“ABA”) rules directly address
multiple representations. Model Rule 1.7 prohibits simultaneous
representation of clients when “the representation of one client will be
directly adverse to another client.” 136 Alternatively, that rule forecloses
multiple representations when there is a “significant risk that representation
of one or more clients will be materially limited” by the attorney’s
responsibilities to a present or former client, or the lawyer’s own
interests. 137
The SEC’s concerns over multiple representations are exacerbated by
its cooperation guidelines. Under these guidelines, a key factor in deciding
how much to reward a whistleblower is “whether the individual was first to
report the misconduct” or to offer cooperation. 138 When the opportunity for
lesser sanctions is offered as a reward for being first to report, the lawyer is
more likely to represent multiple clients with directly competing interests.
Attorneys must address potential conflicts at the onset of representation.
Counsel should document interviews with employees, and consider drafting
a waiver of future conflicts when conflicts might arise. 139 These waivers
must comply with ABA Model Rule 1.7 if the lawyer reasonably believes
he or she “will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to
each affected client,” and the client provides “informed consent, confirmed
in writing.” 140
Although multiple representations are a legitimate concern, vigilance
should be left to the practitioners and not the SEC. Counsel is acutely aware
135. Id. Khuzami stated that: “In many cases, there is no problem presented by multiple
representations – such as when one lawyer or one firm represents employees who are purely
witnesses with no conflicting interests or material risk of legal exposure. There are myriad
benefits that may flow from having one firm represent multiple employees and the corporation.
One advantage is the efficiency unlocked from having one firm that is “intimately familiar” with
complex and critical issues pertinent to the investigation, benefitting not only the company but
also the government that is conducting the investigation. See Michael N. Levy & Todd A.
Ellinwood, Representing Multiple Individuals in Government Investigations, 21 NO. 11 ANDREWS
CORP. OFF. & DIRECTORS LIAB. LITIG. REP. 14, at *2–4 (Nov. 28, 2005).
136. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
137. Id.
138. 17 C.F.R. § 202.12(a)(1)(ii) (2011).
139. In SEC v. Tang, a United States District Court upheld the use of advanced waivers over an
SEC challenge to disqualify the firm. SEC v. Tang, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
In addition to finding that the SEC lacked standing to disqualify, the court determined that the
advance waiver sufficiently alerted the clients upfront regarding the risks of the multiple
representations. Id.; see also SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7, 9–10 (D.C. Cir. 1976); SEC v. Higashi,
359 F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1966).
140. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b) (1983).
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of its obligations under the ABA Model Rules and state disciplinary codes.
Lawyers will not invest substantial time, money and energy into a matter if
there is a risk that multiple representations may run afoul of existing laws.
As the Commission has been quick to recognize, attorneys are on the front
lines in many key corporate matters. Accordingly, they are in the best
position to weigh the relative costs and merits of representing both a
corporation and its many constituents, while also considering the ethical
rules that govern the profession.
B. TROUBLESOME TESTIMONY TACTICS
1. Inappropriate Coaching of Witnesses
The SEC claims that one area of growing concern is the inappropriate
coaching of witnesses, where a lawyer may “train” his or her client to
“lose” recollection of information crucial to an investigation.141 Attorneys
are subject to both SEC and ABA regulations that govern the preparation of
clients for deposition and trial testimony.
Under ABA Model Rule 3.4(b), attorneys are explicitly prohibited from
assisting a witness in preparing false testimony. 142 Rule 7(c) of the SEC
Rules Relating to Investigations outlines permissible conduct for attorneys
that represent, advise, and accompany witnesses before the SEC.143 An
attorney may: (1) advise the client “before, during and after the conclusion”
of the examination, (2) question the client “briefly at the conclusion of the
examination to clarify any of the answers” given, and (3) make notes during
the examination exclusively for the client’s use.144 Attorneys may also
advise the client to avoid speculation or guessing. 145
Beyond these general policies, however, attorneys are given little
guidance on the ethical bounds of witness preparation by the SEC. In fact,
the SEC has neglected to define when permissive witness coaching crosses
the line and exposes a lawyer to discipline. Accordingly, attorneys must

141. Khuzami, UJA Remarks, supra note 133. In his remarks, Khuzami noted, as a general
example, situations “when no amount of contemporaneous documents can refresh a witness’s
absence of recollection on seemingly inculpatory points, but that same witness offers specific,
detailed and consistent memories on most every point potentially helpful to his defenses, often
down to minute details.”
142. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(b) (1983).
143. 17 C.F.R. § 203.7(c) (2008).
144. Id.
145. Khuzami, UJA Remarks, supra note 133. Khuzami acknowledged this well-accepted
practice, however, he expressed his reservations for extreme situations in which “one is left to
wonder whether witnesses are under instructions only to testify about those events that they recall
with near certainty, even in response to questions inviting the witness to qualify the answer with
whatever level of recollection the witness possesses.”
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exercise heightened care when preparing witnesses for SEC depositions or
testimony. 146
2. “Signaling” Behavior During Client Testimony
Related to the issue of improper witness coaching is the SEC’s concern
that some attorneys become inappropriately disruptive or active during
testimony. 147 The Commission argues that this allows counsel to signal
responses to clients, or to prompt them to “forget” information. 148
Again, there is no definitive set of guidelines that constitutes
impermissible signaling. As a lone example, former Enforcement Director
Khuzami focused on one “troubling episode” wherein “defense counsel
would subtly tap his client’s foot with his own after certain questions were
asked,” resulting in the witness “invariably and immediately answer[ing] ‘I
don’t remember.’” 149 However, this behavior may be added in other forms.
For example, lawyers are foreclosed from tampering with witness testimony
under ABA Model Rule 3.4. Nonetheless, members of the defense bar must
also remain active during their client’s testimony for strategic reasons and,
at least some lawyers might be inclined to do so if the SEC approaches
testimony in a prosecutorial, rather than a fact-gathering manner. 150
Aggressive interaction with the Staff is generally required to prevent a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 151
While acts of signaling may obstruct an SEC investigation, lawyers
must protect their client from questioning that is vague, unduly accusatory,
or could result in their case being placed at a procedural disadvantage. As
such, absent jolting examples of clearly impermissible conduct, the SEC
has failed to delineate a reasoned line between the two extremes.
Accordingly, lawyers find themselves stuck in a disquieting web of
ambiguity, and must, therefore, proceed with heightened caution.

146. Id. This line is difficult to discern. When a client fails to recall a key event, attorneys
should advise the client not to speculate on the matter. Khuzami acknowledged that “guessing”
during testimony runs “the risk that a misstatement or speculation could be viewed as an
admission.”
147. Richard Hill, SEC Lawyers to Increase Focus On ‘Inappropriate Conduct’ by Defense, 43
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2403 (2011) [hereinafter Hill, SEC Lawyers to Increase Focus On
‘Inappropriate Conduct’ by Defense].
148. Id.
149. Khuzami, UJA Remarks, supra note 133.
150. Hill, SEC Lawyers to Increase Focus On ‘Inappropriate Conduct’ by Defense, supra note
147.
151. Thomas Zaccaro et al., Expect More Scrutiny of Defense Attorney Conduct, LAW360 (Jan.
7, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/498842/expect-more-sec-scrutiny-of-defense-attorneyconduct.
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C. LATE, DELAYED, AND INADEQUATE DOCUMENT PRODUCTION
The Staff is also skeptical of the handling and production of documents
during SEC investigations. 152 Specifically, the Commission is concerned
with firms rigging privilege logs to withhold relevant documents entirely or,
at least, until the night before or shortly after, testimony. 153 Attorneys must
be forthcoming and upfront in document production during a pending SEC
investigation. An inadequate response to an SEC document request will
trigger credibility concerns from Enforcement Staff. If viewed as a tactic
deliberately designed to obstruct an investigation, the attorney would also
be subject to considerable sanctions, a Rule 102(e) proceeding, and
potentially, a referral to the DOJ for perjury or obstruction charges.
A former Nixon Peabody LLP partner was sentenced to seven years in
prison for criminally obstructing an SEC investigation. 154 The SEC Office
of the General Counsel first initiated a Rule 102(e) action alleging that the
lawyer engaged in “improper or unethical conduct” by backdating
disclosure documents, and removing incriminating data from company
files, prior to an SEC document request. 155 The Rule 102(e) proceedings
were stayed pending the lawyer’s eventual conviction for several felonies in
United States District Court, including, among other things, obstruction of
justice and knowing assistance of his client’s securities law violations. 156
However, the vast majority of cases do not concern direct obstruction.
As a result, the SEC may be bringing Rule 102(e) actions—or worse—
when attorneys negligently, or, in good faith, fail to produce a responsive
document, or produce the relevant document too soon before or too late
after relevant witness testimony. One cannot answer this question without
addressing the practicalities of responding to a voluminous SEC document
subpoena.
Responding to an SEC subpoena is a time-consuming process replete
with managerial, technological, and coordination challenges. When an SEC
subpoena is issued, counsel may have to review terabytes of data in a short
period of time, and make significant judgment calls as to the documents
responsive to the SEC’s request, or subject to the attorney-client

152. Khuzami, UJA Remarks, supra note 133.
153. SEC Enforcement Developments: Renewed Focus on Lawyers, supra note 60, at *4. In

addition, Khuzami voiced displeasure with attorneys “setting aside as potentially privileged an
extremely large and over-inclusive group of documents.” Khuzami, UJA Remarks, supra note
133.
154. Stewart Bishop, Ex-Nixon Peabody Atty Gets 7 Years for $22M Ponzi Coverup, LAW360
(Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/474925/ex-nixon-peabody-atty-gets-7-yearsfor-22m-ponzi-coverup.
155. Jean Eaglesham, Legal Eagles in Cross Hairs, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304868004577376391979631740.
156. In re Tamman, Exchange Act Release No. 69746, 2013 WL 2607651, at *1 (June 12,
2013).
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privilege. 157 Often, less seasoned attorneys will carefully review this data,
make preliminary decisions on unclear questions, and communicate these
findings to more experienced lawyers. Much may be lost in the translation.
No one suggests that this excuses poor behavior, but rather the realities of
this process make slight delays frequent, and tough questions of relevance
or client-privilege create legitimate hurdles.
IV. THE NEED FOR CLARIFICATION AND PROTECTIONS
The lack of clarity and frustration from both the SEC and defense bar
calls out for definitive standards. As such, the SEC must provide clearer
guidelines and protections for attorneys practicing before the Commission if
it continues to seek to prosecute counsel based on their professional
conduct. These guidelines must maintain, rather than chip away from, the
adversarial system without descending into potential harm to the public.
A word about the adversarial system: it enables defense counsel to
adequately protect their clients’ rights, by firmly demonstrating weaknesses
and/or lapses in the Commission’s case. The SEC must carefully consider
the actions it brings, saving both the potential defendant or respondent and
taxpayer funds. The SEC’s attention should be devoted to protecting
investors, promoting capital formation, and encouraging fair and orderly
public markets. Their actions should not, however, seek to govern the
professional responsibility of attorneys, litigate legal ethics, or interfere in
the centuries-old adversarial system. 158 Of course, any changes must
recognize the important SEC mission of protecting the public.
Accordingly, the appropriate series of practical solutions that define the
SEC’s relationship with the bar must be considered. To achieve that goal,
the SEC must implement express language clarifying the scope of Rule
102(e) in three specific areas, as well as agree to refer all violative conduct
to state bar organizations. Finally, there must be protections outside of the
SEC’s conventional arsenal that permit independent review of attorney
investigations and misconduct charges.
A. SETTING PROPER PARAMETERS: THREE WAYS TO CLARIFY THE
SCOPE OF RULE 102(E)
The SEC must modify the express language of Rule 102(e) to limit the
term “improper or unethical conduct” to intentional acts of wrongdoing. At
present, the scope of Rule 102(e) is alarmingly vague. The Commission has
157. See Richard D. Marshall et al., Khuzami on the ‘Epidemic of Perjury’, LAW360 (June 17,
2011), http://www.law360.com/articles/251432/khuzami-on-the-epidemic-of-perjury.
158. The government actively prosecutes attorneys for willful blindness, “even absent actual
knowledge.” Melissa Maleske, Government’s Willful Blindness Theories Put Lawyers at Risk,
LAW360 (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/847489/government-s-willfulblindness-theories-put-lawyers-at-risk. This suggests that attorneys may have to “police” their
clients in addition to advocating for them.
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never defined “unethical or improper professional conduct,” nor has it been
clear as to the requisite mental state an attorney must demonstrate to run
afoul of said Rule. 159 While the D.C. Circuit in Altman found that
“egregious” behavior falls within its ambit, the court left unresolved if
negligent or reckless conduct did as well. Such gaping uncertainty demands
codified clarity.
Rule 102(e) investigations and actions cause serious reputational harm
to lawyers and must be deployed with restraint. By exclusively targeting
intentional misconduct, the SEC may properly focus its resources on
prosecuting egregious obstructionists. If this practice were implemented,
the Staff’s natural tendency to be over-inclusive in investigating attorneys
under the pretext of Rule 102(e) would temper. Potential Rule 102(e)
actions as a tool for intimidation would be limited. When the SEC threatens
sanctions based entirely on negligent or reckless conduct, it can more
readily—and strategically—bring Rule 102(e) investigations to interfere
with an attorney’s ability to zealously defend its client in an agency
action. 160
Reigning in the language of Rule 102(e) would also increase focus on
intentional misconduct and provide certainty for securities lawyers. The
SEC has, in years past, assured lawyers it would not bring Rule 102(e)
proceedings based on negligent conduct. 161 However, staff opinions and
public assurances do not constitute official expressions of the
Commission’s views and certainly do not bind the SEC’s actions.162 Surely,
“[a]n attorney cannot adequately represent his clients when he is worried
about his own liability.” 163 Until Rule 102(e) is explicitly limited to
intentional violations, the very uncertainty over the Rule’s scope will
unnecessarily chill independent legal judgments and ardent defense.
159. See Hill, Divide and Conquer, supra note 55, at 383.
160. See, e.g., Norman S. Johnson & Ross A. Albert, “Déjà Vu All Over Again”: The Securities

and Exchange Commission Once More Attempts to Regulate the Accounting Profession Through
Rule 102(e) of its Rules of Practice, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 553, 573 (1999) (observing that “the
threat of disciplinary action might well intimidate and interfere with the exercise of independent
professional judgment.”).
161. “[T]he Commission ordinarily will not sanction lawyers under the securities laws merely
for giving bad advice, even if that advice is negligent and perhaps worse.” See Giovanni P.
Prezioso, General Counsel, SEC, Remarks before the Spring Meeting of the Ass’n of General
Counsel (Apr. 28, 2005). But see In re John E. Isselmann, Jr., Securities Act Release No. 50428,
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2108 (Sept. 23, 2004), In re Google, Inc. and
David C. Drummond, Securities Act Release No. 8523 (Jan. 13, 2005); see generally In re Ira
Weiss & Andrew Shupe II, Securities Act Release No. 8459, Exchange Act Release No. 50235
(Aug. 24, 2004) (reporting that SEC alleged lawyer knowingly and recklessly issued false tax
opinion); Weiss v. SEC, 468 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that the court upheld the order to
impose sanctions for issuing false tax opinion).
162. In re Altman, Exchange Act Release No. 63306, 2010 WL 5092725, at *16 (Nov. 10,
2010) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d)).
163. Joseph C. Daley & Roberta S. Karmel, Attorneys’ Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar
of the SEC, 24 EMORY L. J. 747, 825 (1975).
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There are two additional changes that the SEC must make to the text of
Rule 102(e). The Rule must exclude legal opinions rendered in good faith.
This would place another appropriate limit on the SEC’s regulatory
authority and prevent intrusions on ethical questions best left to the state bar
associations. Rule 102(e) seeks to defend the integrity of the Commissions’
processes and investigations. However, by their very nature, good faith
legal opinions are not designed to obstruct.
The SEC must also clarify the definition of “practicing” before the
Commission. Specifically, limiting the term to “representation in a pending
investigation,” while excluding from the definition duties such as assisting
companies in the preparation of filings would provide much needed
clarification. The SEC reads the term “practicing” before the agency quite
broadly. Its definition in Rule 102(f) runs the gamut from representation of
clients in inspections or administrative proceedings to the preparation
(however minor) of virtually any statement filed with the Commission. 164
For example, in Loving v. I.R.S., 165 a recent case from the D.C. Circuit,
the court held that the IRS could not legally regulate individuals, who,
while assisting taxpayers in preparation of tax returns, did not represent
those taxpayers in disputes with the agency. 166 Like the SEC’s ability to bar
or suspend persons from “practicing” before it under Rule 102(e), the IRS
may also “regulate the practice of representatives of persons before” the
agency. 167 According to the D.C. Circuit, however, tax preparers do not
“practice” 168—nor do they “represent” taxpayers—before the agency. 169
After Loving, the SEC’s authority to use Rule 102(e) to sanction lawyers
who only prepare filings, but do not represent the client in agency
investigations, seems legally suspect. 170
Implementing these changes ensures that attorneys will better
appreciate the scope of Rule 102(e). Further, the added clarity will promote
zealous advocacy without the added fear of the reputational and financial
harm that accompanies a Rule 102(e) investigation or action.
164. Russel G. Ryan, ‘Practicing Before’ the SEC: Rule 102(e) Scope in Jeopardy After IRS
Setback, 46 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 403 (2014) (citing SEC Rules of Practice, Rule 102(e),
17 C.F.R. § 201.102(f)).
165. Loving v. I.R.S., 742 F.3d 1013, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
166. Id. at 1017 (“Put simply . . . preparers are not agents. They do not possess legal authority
to act on the taxpayer’s behalf. They cannot legally bind the taxpayer by acting on the taxpayer’s
behalf.”).
167. See 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) (2014).
168. Loving, 742 F.3d at 1018 (explaining that “. . . to ‘practice before’ a court or agency
ordinarily refers to practice during an investigation, adversarial hearing, or other adjudicative
proceeding.”).
169. Id. at 1017.
170. See Ryan, supra note 164 (“If . . . the IRS lacks the power to define ‘practicing before’ that
agency to include anything more than representing clients ‘during an investigation, adversarial
hearing, or other adjudicative proceeding,’ the SEC likely has no greater power under its own
rules.”).
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B. MANDATORY REFERRAL OF CONDUCT BASED INFRACTIONS TO
STATE BAR ASSOCIATIONS
The SEC must also refer de novo investigations and prosecutions of
conduct infractions to state bar associations. State organizations, rather than
the SEC’s staff, are the appropriate bodies to regulate original cases of
attorney discipline. Every state bar maintains its own set of professional
conduct rules. These rules already cover much of the behavior the SEC now
wants to sanction. Professor Hill is correct that “it [does] not take an expert
in securities law to determine whether a litigator has destroyed documents,
suborned perjury, obstructed the SEC’s investigation, or otherwise engaged
in unethical conduct.” 171 State bar organizations have proven perfectly
capable of weeding out such misconduct and are the appropriate bodies to
do so.
As compared to the SEC, state bar organizations have superior
experience in investigating and prosecuting attorneys for conduct
violations. 172 This familiarity makes it more likely that infractions are
adjudicated appropriately, and “in accord with commonly accepted
standards of conduct” pursuant to the various state regulations. 173
Supplemental SEC oversight in the realm of professional conduct adds little
and its costs are unnecessary. The Commission must respect zealous
advocacy, and not expect that a lawyer will simply lead a flock of sheep to
slaughter. When it comes to governing the professional conduct of lawyers,
the role of “gatekeeper” is best left to its intended guardians: state bar
organizations already empowered to handle such complaints.
C. INDEPENDENT BOARD TO REVIEW INVESTIGATIONS AND FIELD
COMPLAINTS
Finally, an independent body must be created to review SEC actions
brought pursuant to Rule 102(e). This unit would serve the additional
function of fielding complaints from attorneys and other securities
professionals concerning SEC investigations. There is currently no
checking mechanism, other than the SEC’s discretion, on bringing Rule
102(e) investigations against practitioners. Rule 7(e) authorizes the
Enforcement Staff to report “instances where any witness or counsel has
been guilty of dilatory, obstructionist, or contumacious conduct during the
course of an investigation.” 174 These reports are then referred to the Office
of the General Counsel, which conducts an investigation or charges the
individual(s). A non-partisan review structure, one outside of the SEC’s
171. Hill, Divide and Conquer, supra note 55, at 419–20.
172. Id. at 418–19.
173. Steven C. Krane, The Attorney Unshackled: SEC Rule 2(e) Violates Client’s Sixth

Amendment Right to Counsel, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 50, 89 (1981).
174. 17 C.F.R. § 203.7 (2008).
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conventional bailiwick, provides a necessary check on unbridled
investigations of minor or negligent disciplinary infractions. 175
This oversight system would require the SEC to communicate the
precise basis for a conduct charge to a non-agency committee. 176 When an
impartial body reviews a written account of the attorney’s behavior, the
lawyer will more likely feel that his conduct has been fairly adjudicated.
This system promotes dual benefits. It improves accountability of both the
SEC and lawyers, while resulting in a greater sense of procedural fairness
for both parties. Providing a mechanism for attorneys to submit complaints
assures lawyers that their zealous defense will not be undermined by
questionable SEC investigations. This system would inject an element of
credibility into the SEC’s Rule 102(e) charges, while providing protections
for attorneys to affirmatively check dubious cases.
CONCLUSION
Attorneys are subject to numerous rules that underscore an utmost duty
of loyalty to the client, but these obligations exist against a backdrop that
requires obeisance to the law, attention to moral considerations, and ethical
factors. 177 Advocates defending clients in SEC proceedings will be aware of
these responsibilities. Those who violate the federal securities or criminal
laws will be prosecuted for their actions. The SEC and DOJ are the proper
agencies to pursue these violators or criminals. Violations of professional
responsibility and unethical conduct, however, are matters appropriately
delegated to state bar organizations.
Additionally, the SEC’s intensified focus on attorney conduct harms the
agency’s core missions. The SEC is devoted to protecting investors and the
public markets, while promoting the capital raising process. Only through
the adversarial system may these goals be effectively pursued. When the
SEC polices the conduct of attorneys who represent its adversaries, it
becomes the prosecuting attorney, judge, and jury, all in one. This result is
unjust and inequitable. It casts a chilling effect on zealous defense and
limits the ability of counsel to provide independent judgments. Attorneys
cannot confidently demonstrate weaknesses in the Commission’s cases, and
clients lose the benefits of full representation and a fair process.178 This also
175. See, e.g., Leslie Donavan, Comment, Justice Department’s Prosecution Guidelines of
Little Value to State and Local Prosecutors, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 955, 965 (1981)
(“Meaningful control of discretion is impossible without at least some form of internal
administrative review.”).
176. The precise composition of the committee could include an equal distribution of retired
members of the bar and former SEC staffers. For example, the ABA and SEC could nominate and
elect these members, respectively, on a bi-annual basis.
177. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
178. See, e.g., Steven C. Krane, The Attorney Unshackled: SEC Rule 2(e) Violates Clients’
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 50 (1981) (describing the potential
constitutional due process issues raised and implicated by these procedures).
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thwarts the integrity of the SEC’s investigations. The Commission correctly
recognized that part of an attorney’s “duty . . . must [be to] advocate his
client’s position forcefully in order to advance the integrity of the
proceeding.” 179
Now more than ever, the SEC must recognize the need to clarify the
scope of its rules and implement protections for attorneys that practice
before the agency. These practical solutions create tangible reform that will
benefit not only lawyers and the SEC, but the public as well.

179. In re Blizzard, 77 SEC Docket 1335, 2002 WL 714444, at *2 (Apr. 24, 2002).

